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Abstract
How can financial tools like real options and hedging mitigate and create value from uncertainty
in transportation? This paper describes these concepts and identifies research on them that has
relevance to transportation. It then gives historical background of the containerized ocean
transportation industry, uses Porter's five forces to explain its dynamics, and explains how
contracts are set up and managed. It identifies areas within containerized ocean transportation
that could benefit from real options and hedging, claiming that recent deregulation is creating
opportunities for innovative thought. It gives examples of how real options are already being
used in the industry to create flexibility without having any price attached to them and then
comes up with new ideas of using them. It concludes by, first, stating that both shippers and
carriers can benefit from managing uncertainty together and, second, suggesting future areas of
research.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Chris Caplice
Title: Executive Director, Master of Engineering in Logistics Program
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Introduction
Everyday uncertainty in the transportation industry complicates the management of
contracts and operations, and has made it difficult for the service providers (carriers) to operate
efficiently. In the current environment shippers are faced with uncertain costs due to changing
surcharges that are added to the negotiated base rate for the shipment. These surcharges can be
due to changes in fuel prices, congestion at ports, or transportation at peak season, etc.
These uncertainties are usually thought of as being negative. Real options, counter
intuitively, see value in uncertainty. Real options are a right but not an obligation to take an
action and the more the uncertainty the higher is the value of the option. Another important
aspect of real options is that they can put a price on flexibility, such as the flexibility that is
necessary in an industry where demand is uncertain.
Change is driven by incentives (Byrnes & Shapiro, 1991) and knowing where the value
is, creates an opportunity for change. If a producer of a product can solve any operational
problem he has by charging the customer more without worrying that the customer will leave, he
lacks the incentive to solve his problems and remove the extra cost from the system. This is a
powerful concept when dealing with uncertainty that is industry specific, because instead of
taking the uncertainty for granted, it may be possible to eliminate it.
Some uncertainties come from the outside and cannot be managed within the industry.
These are for examples fluctuations in fuel prices and currencies. There are advanced hedging
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tools within the finance industry which may be applicable to the industry of containerized ocean
transportation.
The thesis focuses on contracting in containerized ocean transportation. It identifies the
major competitive forces, the interaction between carriers and shippers, its uncertainties, and
examines its recent trends.
The transportation of containers, which has its origins in the late 1950s and took off in
the 1960s, has seen considerable and continuing deregulation in the USA since 1998. The
European Commission is now, in 2005, working towards the same goal, albeit with different
methods. The industry is fragmented - the largest carrier has 10% of the world capacity. It is
undergoing a transition from point to point transportation services to more inclusive logistics
contracts that seek to add value to the shippers business. This development is also being pushed
by shippers, whose focus is shifting from seeking the lowest transportation price to seeking a
reliable service that minimizes the cost of stock-outs. The shippers are also growing in size and
their leverage is increasing. A decision of one shipper - Wal-Mart - to concentrate its shipments
for the peak season on two months instead of spreading it over four or more months, had effects
on the whole industry (Mongelluzzo, 2004, September 6).
The uncertainty that characterizes the industry of containerized ocean transportation and
has so far been regarded as problematic and devaluating is, for example, demand volatility over
lanes, transit time volatility, fuel price volatility, currency fluctuations, capacity constraints, port
capacity, and the business cycle. The objective of this thesis is to determine if real options can be
used to create value from this uncertainty.
Chapter 2 describes the main attributes of real options and summarizes a discussion on
their use and applicability. The chapter focuses on aspects of real options that are specifically
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interesting in the context of contracts. Chapter 3 describes containerized ocean transportation in
detail amongst other things through the use of Porter's five forces (Porter, 1980). It explains why
the customary way of doing things might be coming to an end, and leads the discussion into
chapter 4, which explains contracts within the industry and identifies real options within it. It
claims that the industry's incentive system creates a barrier to change. Chapter 5 suggests future
areas of research as well as claiming that it is not only a good idea, but a necessary idea, to start
using new tools to increase cooperation not only between shippers and ocean carriers, but also
between ocean carriers and their suppliers, such as those who offer services in the ports.
10
2 Real Options and
Management of Uncertainty
Uncertainty that traditionally is considered a problem has a value when looked at from
the perspective of real options. Understanding the variables that determine the value of real
options can also help to manage uncertainty. Real options theory is however still under
development. There are opposing views regarding where they are applicable, how their value
should be calculated, and even if they have use outside their theoretical application. This chapter
identifies the main issues regarding real options, and describes the aspects that may have
relevance to containerized ocean transportation.
2.1 What Is a Real Option?
A real option is "a right, but not an obligation, to take some action now, or in the future,
for a pre-determined price." (de Neufville, 2004). The concept of option comes from the world of
finance, where in the simplest case, the owner of an option can decide at or up to a certain time
to buy or sell the underlying asset of the option. The underlying asset can for example be a stock
in a company where future price is uncertain. An option that can be exercised only at a specific
point in time is called a European option, whereas an option that can be exercised anytime up to
a specific point in time is called an American option. An option that gives the owner the right to
buy the underlying asset is a call option, and the option that gives the owner the right to sell an
11
underlying asset is a put option. The term real option extends the use of options from financial
assets to something tangible as opposed to purely financial.
Using real options in the design of a system is a way to build flexibility into a system that
is designed for an environment that has future uncertain states. There are different types of real
options, the main ones being the option to defer, the option to expand, the option to shrink, the
option to abandon, and the option to switch. Compound real options are yet another type, where
a project is built in phases and each phase is dependent on the phase before (Copeland &
Antikarov, 2003). When thinking in terms of real options a call option becomes an option to
seize an opportunity and a put option becomes an option to get out of a bad situation. Examples
of real options are given below.
Zhao and Tseng (2003) describes the construction of a parking garage, in which the
demand for parking spaces is uncertain. Instead of assuming a deterministic demand and
designing to that assumption, real options are introduced. The garage is built with a certain
number of floors, but the columns are over-dimensioned, thus creating an option to add extra
floors later if needed. This means that a real option to expand has been designed into the project.
Weck, de Neufville and Chaize (2004) discusses the case of a communication satellite
system that went bankrupt. The system was designed according to fixed requirements and was
built in one stage. The paper argues that designing flexibility into the system and building it in
stages would have made the project profitable. Building in stages would have allowed the
designers to incorporate better information into their design requirements. Designing flexibility
into the system would have allowed the system to be changed to meet market demand. This is a
description of a compound real option that allows the owner to defer the decision to go ahead
with the next stage. It can also be seen as an option to expand.
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Reykjavik Energy, which operates the water distribution system for the capital city of
Iceland, has kept operational a small water reservoir that is only intended for use during extreme
peak water consumption (Hjartarson, 1994). This is a switch option: the pumps at the small water
reservoir are switched on during extreme demand, but are otherwise switched off. Copeland and
Antikarov (2003) gives the option to open or close a mine as an example of a switching option: if
the price of the material being mined are unfavorable the mine can be closed, and vice versa
opened if prices are favorable.
Copeland and Antikarov (2003) go on to give an example of a jet engine producer that
offers customers the option to cancel orders. This gives the customers a real option to shrink
their order if the market situation changes.
In the case of an airport expansion in South America, De Neufville (2004) explains how
the whole project can be segmented into phases, where each phase is designed so as to minimize
the cost of abandoning the project if demand doesn't support the expansion. The first phase in
such a project could, for example, be to secure land for an airport, a process that can take years.
This first phase can be started without spending too much money on design, for example. This
means that the project is set up in such a way that the owner of it has a real option to abandon it.
A type of a real option that clearly creates flexibility is postponement, a concept familiar
to supply chain specialists. The classic example is from Benetton where the product and the
supply chain is designed to allow the company to decide the color of sweaters right before their
sold, instead of deciding it early on in the production. This is achieved by producing a greige
sweater that can be colored just before it is sold, when it is possible to forecast more accurately
the demand for specific colors. (Signorelli & Heskett, 1984). This is a real option in the sense
that you can prevent lost sales by deferring the decision of the color.
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What postponement, and in general real options are doing, is delaying the need for
decision making until some of the uncertainty has been resolved, i.e. they create flexibility and
this flexibility has value.
2.2 Valuing Real Options
There are six variables used to define the value of a real option: the value of the
underlying asset, the strike price, the duration of the option, the underlying asset's volatility, the
risk-free interest rate, and dividends (Copeland & Antikarov, 2003). The case of the parking
garage described in Section 2.1 can illustrate these variables. In this case the columns in a
parking garage were built thicker than necessary, so that it would be possible to build extra floors
on top of it in case of a high demand for parking spaces. The value of the underlying asset is the
value of cash-flows of the parking garage itself. The strike price is the cost of building the extra
floors. The duration of the option is undetermined, since it is there during the lifetime of the
garage. The volatility is based on the volatility in demand. The dividends would be the cash
inflows and outflows from the parking garage investment after it became operational. The value
of the option that is calculated from the above variables is the increase in the value of the total
project, from what it would have been without the over-dimensioning. Finally, the price of the
real option is the cost of building thicker columns and should therefore be less than the option's
value.
An important aspect of options is that they have the counter-intuitive properties of having
a higher value, the more the uncertainty is. This is because an option allows you to reap all the
benefits of a good situation, while allowing you to get rid of the risk of the bad situation.
Let's consider an opportunity X where the volatility of the payoff stretches uniformly
from -3 to 3. Anything below 0 is a bad situation and everything above 0 is a good situation.
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Now let's consider an opportunity Y where the payoff stretches uniformly from -4 to 4. The
volatility of Y is higher than that of X. Since the option is only exercised if the payoff is above 0,
the value of the option Y is higher than that of A.
Figure 1 shows the payoff for two normally distributed assets with the same mean but
different volatility for a call option. The asset with the higher volatility has the higher payoff.
Figure 1
The higher the volatility the higher the potential pay-off since the downside can
always be ignored.
Low volatility
High volatility
Expected payoff
for low volatility
Value of underlying asset
Strike price
Both shaded areas
are expected payoff
for high volatility
Based on Copeland and Antikarov (2003)
In certain cases of real options it is possible to attach an exact value to the option being
created. This is possible when the uncertainty is known and the option is simple, you either use
the option or not. The calculations soon become overly complicated when more dimensions are
added to the equation. (Kalligeros, 2004).
Copeland and Antikarov (2003) recommend four steps to calculate the value of real
options. The first step is to calculate the net present value without taking uncertainty into
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account. The second step is to combine all the uncertainties into one uncertainty, for example
using the Monte Carlo simulation. The combined uncertainty is then used to build an event tree
that describes all possible outcomes. The third step is to identify the responses management will
have under different outcomes in the event tree, and add them to the tree, creating a decision tree.
The fourth and final step is to calculate the payoffs in the decision tree.
This method shows that in order to put a value on a real option it is not only necessary to
understand the uncertainty affecting the value of the real option, but also to take into account
different management responses as events unfold. This is the largest difference between the
evaluation of a real option versus a financial option. The variables used for the evaluation of a
financial options are fixed, whereas the variables of the real option can be influenced by its
owner.
2.3 Strategic Use of Real Options
Leslie and Michaels (1997) identifies two kinds of flexibility that come with real options:
reactive and proactive. This is an important distinction. With financial options the owner of the
option is reacting to exogenous factors, such as the price of the stock, thus the flexibility is
reactive. When the owner influences factors in order to increase the value of the option, the
flexibility is proactive.
The paper identifies six ways for the owner to proactively increase the value of the
option: increase future revenues, decrease future costs, increase the volatility of the future net
income, increase the duration of the option, limit the loss that waiting to exercise the option
causes, and to increase the risk-free interest rate. The price of the option is most sensitive to the
first three ways. The largest value of real options as a strategic tool is that it changes the
perception of uncertainty from something to fear to an opportunity.
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"The real power of real options lies in strategic application," (Leslie & Michels, 1997).
Just by applying the way of thinking that real options entail, such that there is value in
uncertainty, may lead to beneficial management approaches. It may not be necessary to go to
extreme details to get the value out of the real options philosophy. McGrath et al. (2004) states
that the value of real options is amongst other things in keeping costs in check while there is still
high uncertainty, and allowing a company to go after possibilities with the potential for high
payoff. Mittendorf (2004) describes how the value of a real option can be increased by
controlling the flow of information as a decision to take action is delayed.
Kogut and Kulatilaka (2001) states that options have value because of uncertainty,
duration, and the owner's choice. It then describes how a multinational company is creating
options by its presence in different countries. It can react to currency fluctuations by shifting
production from one country to another. The company has in effect a real option to switch
production from one country to another. The paper values the option by looking only at the
volatility in the currency, stating that looking at only one of the volatilities gives a minimum
value of an option. The paper then mentions the possibility of writing short-term contracts that
give the company the real option to switch suppliers, if the currency rate favors it.
A related way of thinking is presented by Chi (2000), where joint ventures are described
as options and a mathematical framework to value these options is described. In this case, two
companies might form a joint venture around a project and they would then have the option to
buy the other company's stakes in the joint venture. It is perceivable that a shipper and carrier
might want to form such a joint venture when going in with a production in a new area. The
shippers and the carriers could by doing so cooperate to maximize the profit of the joint venture,
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thus maximizing their own profit. As the business matured the carrier could buy the shipper out
of the joint venture.
Pochard (2003) describes how a manufacturer can diversify away his risks by using a
dual sourcing policy. It concludes that this is a viable possibility and uses the real options theory
to assign a value for the policy. Billington (2002) describes how Hewlett-Packard used a dual
sourcing policy in practice. What Hewlett-Packard did was to create a portfolio of different
contracts for the sourcing of a part. One type of the contract was a long-term contract focusing
on meeting the bulk of the demand (for example 90%) for the low price such a contract offers.
The other type of contract in the portfolio was a short-term contract, that had a higher price, but a
guaranteed supply of parts to meet demand volatility. In effect, Hewlett-Packard had the option
to expand or shrink their parts supply without losing much of the benefits of a long-term
contract.
Real Options are used to take uncertainty into account when a decision is made. There are
different types of real options but the common attribute is that real options allow managers to
calculate the value of being able to change the direction of a project or cancel a project after the
initial investments have been made.
2.4 Limits to Real Options
The science of real options is evolving and what exactly is meant by the term real options
has not been established on a common basis for all (McGrath, Ferrier, & Mendelow, 2004).
Where they are applicable and what constitutes a real option as opposed to a series of decisions
is taken up by Adner and Levinthal (2004). Since the real option allows managers to abandon a
project, the paper argues that a company that uses real options in its decision making process
should have a higher percentage of initiated projects that are cancelled. Although it doesn't
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answer the question, whether this is so, it points out that it is easier to initiate an investment than
to cancel it, and if this tendency is allowed to go unchecked, the value of the real options might
be forfeited. A company using real options should therefore have a clear set of guidelines and
built in incentives that guide the decision makers.
Figure 2 is an overview of the "traps" that management can fall into when using real
options for strategic purposes. "Technical agenda fixed" means that the product cannot be
changed to meet the market's reaction, whereas "Technical agenda flexible" means that the
product can be changed. "Target market fixed" means that the product is only meant for one
specific target market and cannot be launched in another market if the original market doesn't
respond favorably to it, whereas "Target market flexible" means that the product can be tried out
in another market if the first one responds unfavorably.
Figure 2
"Option Traps".
Technical agenda fixed
Technical agenda flexible
Target market fixed
Option trap: in the absence of
expiration, the firm can
maintain the option
indefinitely until conditions
improve
"Things will get better"
Option trap: further
development efforts always
hold the potential for
overcoming any negative
market signal
"We can try harder"
Target market flexible
Option trap: negative market
signals may lead to a search
for new potential markets or
market interventions rather
than abandonment
"We can try it somewhere
else"
Option trap: too many degrees
of freedom for ruling out
success
"We can make this work"
Source: Adner and Levinthal (2004)
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McGrath et al. (2004) disagrees with this approach and says that deciding beforehand
under what circumstances an option will be abandoned ignores the potential of the real option
that is specifically designed so that decisions can be made under new information. It also
underlines that real options are about more than canceling a project; they are about switching
between choices, scaling a project up or down. Kogut and Kulatilaka (2004) further state that a
company invents heuristics to counter the tendencies presented in Figure 2. Adner and Levinthal
(2004, pp. 120-126) says that although heuristics created through real options can be helpful, the
company needs to be careful regarding which context the heuristics are used in. It states that just
as deterministic methods can lead to foregone opportunities, the use of real options heuristics can
lead to over investment.
The following chapters explore how the containerized ocean transportation industry looks
like and how real options can be used within it. The "Option Traps" (Figure 2) are a figure that
can help the real options practitioner avoid mistakes.
2.5 The Power of Real Options
This chapter has described the concept of real options and explained how they are valued.
There are three points from this chapter that are good to keep in mind, before moving on to
explore containerized ocean transportation. The first item is that real options are a way to create
value from uncertainty - uncertainty is not necessarily bad. The second point is that real options
can be used for strategic purposes - they are not only applicable to one-off investment projects.
The third is that use of real options may have limits - using real options strategy to initiate a
project without using it to abandon the project can lead to unprofitable decisions. Chapter 4 will
tie real options with ocean transportation contracting, but first, Chapter 3 describes the industry
of containerized ocean transportation.
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3 Forces and Uncertainty in
Containerized Ocean
Transportation
This chapter uses Michael Porter's five forces model to analyze the industry of
containerized ocean transportation. The five forces are rivalry between industry players, supplier
power, customer power, threat of substitutes, and barriers to entry. Understanding how strong the
forces are and how they interact can help a company position itself strategically within a segment
of the industry that will give it the maximum success (Porter, 1980). Using the five forces here is
a way to understand how the companies in the industry are positioned and why the industry is as
it is.
In the case of this industry the customers are the shippers, suppliers are those who
provide the industry with ships, containers, ports, terminals, and sometimes transportation from
port to the end customer, the substitutes would be other modes of transportation, barriers to entry
are anything that works against newcomers in the industry, and the players are the ocean carriers,
which vary in size and services.
P. Keller (Presentation at MIT, 2005, March 7) describes three main groups of ocean
carriers: First, second, and third tier. First-tier carriers can offer full supply chain services
integrated into the shippers operations. Second-tier carriers offer door-to-door services, where
the shipper still looks at the transportation link as independent from other operations. Third-tier
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carriers offer only port-to-port services. In many cases, instead of dealing directly with the
shippers, the carriers are dealing with intermediaries.
These intermediaries are Freight Forwarders (FF) and Non-Vessel Operating Common
Carriers (NVOCC). FFs arrange shipments for shippers and take care of the paperwork involved.
They can be either individuals or companies. NVOCCs take this service a step further, both
operating as a Common Carrier towards the shipper, with its own bill of ladings (see Section
4.1). They may also consolidate shipments, even within containers. They do however not operate
their own vessels, and to the ocean carriers the NVOCCs function as shippers. The NVOCCs
enable smaller shippers through the consolidation of shipments to enjoy prices and services
closer to those of a large shipper with high leverage, as is discussed in section 3.3.
This chapter provides an understanding of the industry needed in order to generate ideas
about how real options and derivatives trading can be applied. Section 3.1 describes the industry
in general terms. Section 3.2 explains how the industry's environment is changing through
deregulation thus increasing competition between carriers. Section 3.3 uses Porter's five forces
to analyze the industry. Section 3.4 introduces the uncertainties that are predominant in the
industry, and section 3.5 ties the results to chapter 4.
3.1 Industry Background
The first shipment of containers sailed from New York to Houston on April 26, 1956.
Ten years later the first international shipment left USA for Europe. (Carr, 1998).
Containerization had a dramatic effect on liner shipping. Liners are common carriers that publish
time tables for specific lanes that are followed whether the ship is full or not and that publish
tariffs, which dictate the terms of the contract with the shipper. Tramps are the opposite of liners
and are usually chartered by a shipper for a one-off full load shipment. Liner shipping has its
22
origin in the late 1860s when the steamship entered the market offering reliable ocean
transportation that was mostly weather independent. (Sjostrom, 2004).
In the 1860s governments protected the liner shipping industry through regulations as
they considered it to be central to their countries well being. The regulation prevented amongst
other things international mergers, forced liners to publish their rates and tariffs forbidding them
to negotiate confidential contracts, as well as later exempting them from anti-trust laws (Carr,
1998).
This exemption from anti-trust laws has enabled ocean carriers to operate conferences,
which are discussed in section 3.2, where the carriers over a specific route agree on common
tariffs for the type of cargo to be shipped. They can also agree on how demand for transportation
is distributed between the carriers (Sjostrom, 2004).
The containers brought with them efficiency that has undermined the premise for the
government regulations. Using containers instead of pallets cut the time a ship spends in a port
from 3 weeks to around 24 hours enabling and supporting the recent globalization of business
(Carr, 1998).
A standard container is 8 feet wide and 8,5 feet high. Its length varies with the most
common being 20, 40, and 45 feet. The standard measurement when discussing capacity is a 20
feet container, or a twenty foot equivalent unit, TEU. The world capacity for containerized ocean
transportation in 2003 was 8.5 million TEUs, and grew by 8.3% from the year before (United
Nations, 2004). This trend fits with the overall 8.5% average annual containerized freight trade
growth since 1998 (Department of Transportation, 2005).
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From the annual reports of the largest carriers it can be estimated that annual revenues
per 1 TEU of capacity in the year 2003 were around USD 18,000. The total revenues of the
containership industry were therefore around USD 150 billion.
Ships that are completely dedicated to containers represented 74.7% of the total world
capacity for transportation of containers in 2004, up from around 73.7% the year before (United
Nations, 2004). This percentage has been rising every year; in 1985 it was around 40%
(Stopford, 2001). The rest of the capacity is provided by general cargo ships (single-deck and
multi-deck), roll on - roll off (ro-ro) cargo, and bulk carriers as Figure 3 depicts.
Figure 3
Container capacity by group of ships.
Dedicated Containerships 74.7%
Others 1O General Cargo Ships 18%
Bulk Carriers 2.5% Ro-ro 3.8%
Source: United Nations (2004).
Overcapacity is decreasing for all types of cargo ships as can be seen from Figure 4. This
has lead to a huge demand for new ships, not least for containerships, as can be seen from Figure
5. Figure 6 then shows two things: how the fleet of dedicated containerships has been growing
steadily and how the proportion of TEU capacity against number of ships has been getting lower,
indicating that containerships are getting larger.
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Figure 4
Trends in overcapacity for Tankers, Dry Bulk, and General Cargo (including
containers).
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Figure 6
Trends in the world of dedicated containership fleet from 1988 to 2008. The year
2006 to 2008 are based on orders on hand.
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The size of the business, capacity development, demand development, and the effect this
is having on the price to customers underline the relevance of finding opportunities for increased
efficiency within the industry.
The following three graphs explain how supply and demand are having an effect on the
price over the major trade lanes. First, Figure 7 shows how there is an imbalance in the flow of
products for all ocean transportation, from the developing countries to the developed market
economies. Second, Figure 8 shows how this is also true for containerized ocean transportation.
Third, Figure 9 shows how this imbalance affects the prices, that are much higher to North
America than from North America. Furthermore, Figure 9 shows how prices over the major lanes
have been increasing over the eight quarters from the start of 2002 to the middle of 2004.
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Figure 7
All ocean transportation by areas as a percentage of weight.
Goods shipped from...
Developing Countries 48%
Developed Market
Economy Countries
41%
Eastern Europe 5%
Socialist Asia (including China) 6%
Goods shipped to...
Socialist Asia (including China) 8%
Eastern Europe 1%
Developed Market
Developing Countries 30% Economy Countries
61%
Source: United Nations (2004)
Figure 8
Volume imbalance in the shipments of containers.
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Imbalance in volume over lanes leads to large price differences. The figure shows
the price development from the first quarter in 2002 to the second quarter in 2004
for both directions on the three major lanes.
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This section has described the industry in general terms, given insight into how much it
costs to ship a container, how large the industry is, and how surplus capacity has decreased
substantially. It was pointed out that the industry has been exempt from anti-trust laws enabling
cooperation amongst competitors, which deserves more explanation.
3.2 Deregulation Is Changing the Market Dynamics
The first modem version of a conference was the U.K.-Calcutta conference formed in
1875. Conferences are a cooperation platform for ocean carriers shipping on a specific route. The
conferences establish common rates, called freight tariffs, and timetables over specific routes,
thereby coordinating the supply of capacity. The supply of capacity is also controlled through
cargo quotas and sailing quotas (Sjostrom, 2004). Carriers within a conference traditionally
could not deviate from the freight tariffs issued by the conference.
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Sjostrom (2004) describes that the reason for the first conferences was perceived to be to
cope with excess capacity, although the real reason had probably more to do with perceived
failure of the competition. Today there are about 150 conferences in the world. Some of the
larger ones are Transpacific Westbound Freight Agreement, the Trans Atlantic Conference
Agreement, and Far East Freight Conference. Although there have always been carriers outside
the conferences that keep up the competition on a trade route their power has recently been
undermined through government deregulation.
The Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998 (OSRA) passed by the American Senate
allowed carriers to establish confidential one-on-one contracts with shippers. This was aimed at
increasing competition and reducing the influence of conferences. In 1998 there were 35
conferences on file at the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), in 2001 there were 19. This
may however not be the work of OSRA as the number of conferences in the US in 1982 was 90
(Sjostrom, 2004). OSRA has led to an increase in service contracts within the ocean liner
industry (Federal Maritime Commission, 2001). Deregulation is continuing with the most recent
one being on January 15, 2005, when NVOCCs (see section 3.1) were for the first time allowed
to enter into confidential contracts with shippers (FMC, 2004). The focus on deregulation in the
industry is, however, not confined to the United States.
The European Commission issued a White Paper on conferences in 2003, where it
discusses abolishing the liners rights to operate conferences on trade routes to and from the
European Union. The European Liners Affairs Association (ELAA) is open towards the
suggestion but wants to keep possibilities for discussions and information sharing between
carriers, in order to facilitate estimations of market size, data for demand and supply by
commodity, and to operate a public price index (European Commission, 2004). The American
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Institute for Shippers' Associations (AISA) supports abolishing the conference system and
opposes the ELAA suggestions. Generally speaking the AISA does not see any difference
between the ocean carrier industry and other industries and opposes any exceptions from anti-
trust laws (American Institute for Shippers' Association, 2004). European Shippers' Council
(ESC) is of the same opinion (ESC, 2004).
The changes described above show that the traditional way of doing business within the
industry is changing. In a time of high demand and low capacity, as the case is now in the
beginning of 2005, the ocean carriers have the opportunity to use their leverage to keep the old
system going or to lead changes that can benefit the industry as a whole. These are changes that
could affect the relationship along the whole transportation chain, stretching from inland
transportation through the ports and the carriers to the shippers. The next section describes how
the industry looks like today.
3.3 Porter's Five Forces Analysis
The containerized ocean transportation should be a good industry to be in. First, the
rivalry between carriers has been relatively little, as they have been able to allocate volume
between themselves and set prices over specific lanes through conferences. Although this is
changing as section 3.2 describes, it has not completely gone away, and the same surcharges are
still being used industry wide. Second, Threat of substitute products, such as air cargo, is low as
the price difference and capacity make it unattractive. Third, bargaining power of customers has
traditionally been fairly low, although that is changing with the possibility for confidential
contracts between shippers and ocean carriers on the one hand and between NVOCCs and
shippers on the other hand. Finally, there are high capital barriers to entry as well as market
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barriers in the form of cooperation between existing players on the market. The only drawback is
that suppliers of the ocean carriers have high leverage.
It is therefore counter-intuitive that carriers traditionally have low operating margins. One
explanation is that until 2004 there was much overcapacity (see Figure 4) and the carriers
couldn't afford to be selective of customers. In 2004 there was under-capacity which pushed up
prices and allowed carriers to be more selective of customers. Given the high number of new
containerships being built (see Figure 5) this is likely to change again in the future, thus creating
a pattern where every few years it is the shipper's world and the next few years it is the carrier's
world, a concern voiced by both shippers and carriers at an industry conference (CTL, 2005).
Another thing to keep in mind when going through the five forces analysis is that the
industry is not homogenous. It has different kinds of ocean carriers as described in the beginning
of this chapter. There may be fierce competition over one lane while another lane is lacking in
competition. There is a wide variety of lane compositions possible and although it may be
difficult to differentiate the service from port to port, it is possible for a carrier to differentiate in
which ports it offers. However, there are three main trade routes that are dominating the demand
for containerized ocean transportation: Asia - USA, Asia - Europe, and Europe - USA. The shift
of manufacturing from Europe and USA to Asia is driving a huge surge in demand over the
routes to Asia that has lead to under-capacity in an industry that is used to excess capacity as
well as leading to congestion in ports.
Figure 10 shows the five forces diagram for the industry. It is discussed in more detail in
the following sections.
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Figure 10
Five forces for first-tier and second-tier carriers
3.3.1 Rivalry
The industry is fragmented. Table 1 shows the 20 largest carriers in the world for the year
2002 and 2003. The largest carrier has 10.1% of the TEU capacity in 2003, 4 percentage points
more than the next largest carrier. The Herfindahl index is used to measure concentration within
an industry. The index is calculated by summing up the squares of the market share of the
companies within the industry (Caplice, 1996). Thus and industry with two companies, each with
a 50% market share, has a Herfindahl index of 502+ 502= 5000. According to the Department of
Justice (1997) an industry with a Herfindahl index of over 1800 is highly concentrated. An index
between 1000 and 1800 means a moderately concentrated industry, and an industry with an
index below 1000 is fragmented. The Herfindahl index for the industry of containerized ocean
transportation is below 350. It cannot be calculated accurately since the market shares of all
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carriers within it are not available. However, the 20 largest carriers have a market share of 64.5%
and add 292 to the index. The 2 0 th largest carrier has 1.3% market share measured in capacity so
the maximum the carriers below that can add to the index is 47. The industry in the world market
area is therefore fragmented.
Table 1
The 20 largest carriers, their ranking and capacity for 2003 and 2002.
Change in
Ranking Carrier # of ships ranking TEU 2003 % of total TEU 2002 % of total
1 A.P. M6ller Group Denmark 328 No Change 844,626 10.1% 773,931 10.0%
2 MSC Switzerland 217 No Change 516,876 6.2% 413,814 5.4%
3 Evergreen Group Taiwan 152 uP 1 442,310 5.3% 403,932 5.2%
4 P&O Nediloyd UK/Netherlands 157 DOWN 1 419,527 5.0% 406,654 5.3%
5 CMA-CGM Group France 150 UP 3 299,174 3.6% 225,436 2.9%
6 Hanjin/DSR-Senator Republic of Korea/Germi 76 DOWN 1 290,677 3.5% 304,409 3.9%
7 COSCO China 148 DOWN 1 274,128 3.3% 255,937 3.3%
8 NOL/APL Singapore 82 DOWN 1 273,573 3.3% 227,749 3.0%
9 NYK Japan 91 UP 2 233,934 2.8% 177,700 2.3%
10 MOL Japan 72 DOWN 1 222,533 2.7% 188,326 2.4%
11 CP Ships Group Canada 85 DOWN 1 201,706 2.4% 187,890 2.4%
12 K Line Japan 63 No Change 186,017 2.2% 168,413 2.2%
13 OOCL Hong Kong 55 UP 1 185,502 2.2% 157,493 2.0%
14 Zim Israel 79 DOWN 1 174,480 2 .1% 164,350 2.1%
15 Hapag Lloyd Germany 41 uP i 154,850 1.9% 135,953 1.8%
16 Yang Ming Taiwan 55 UP 2 153,783 1.8% 120,319 1. 6 %
17 China Shipping China 94 DOWN 2 143,655 1.7% 148,212 1.9%
18 Hyundai Republic of Korea 35 DOWN 2 136,548 1.6% 122,713 1.6%
19 CSAV Chile 55 up i 123,378 1.5% 90,625 1.2%
20 PIL Group Singapore 92 DOWN 1 106,508 1.3% 97,827 1.3%
Total top 20 5,383,785 64.5% 4,771,683 61.8%
World fleet estimate 8,354,000 100.0% 7,713,000 100.0%
Source: United Nations (2004)
Porter (1980) explains why an industry is fragmented. Many of his reasons fit the
industry of containerized ocean transportation. First, an industry is likely to be fragmented if
there is little advantage for competitors to be large when dealing with customers. For the industry
of containerized ocean transportation the published rates, the ban on confidential contracts, and
demand allocation between carriers within a conference did exactly that. Second, if exit barriers
are high, poor performers stay on in the industry. Containerships both demand heavy investment
and can only be used for one thing: transporting containers. So even if an ocean carrier goes
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bankrupt, its TEU capacity is likely to be bought or chartered by someone, even cheaply during a
bust-period. Third, local presence, local connections, and local regulations can give local rivals
an advantage. The ocean carriers come from different areas of the world and have different
cultures, fulfilling this criterion for a fragmented market.
Although the first reason for fragmentation, the lack of benefits for being large, has now
been removed, that is not necessarily enough to overcome fragmentation, since companies may
get stuck in the traditional way of doing things and don't see the opportunity presented to them
(Porter, 1980). In this industry, however, there has been consolidation of ocean carriers for
example the merger between Maersk and Sealand and between NOL and APL. It is also
noteworthy that between the years 2002 and 2003 there were no new entrants to the top 20 list
presented in Table 1 and the top 20 carriers increased there market share from 61.8% to 64.5%
indicating consolidation within the industry.
Until high demand eliminated the overcapacity in the industry in 2004, overcapacity and
the high barriers of exit were the reason for the low operating margins, as explained by Porter
(1980): "Exit barriers ... keep companies competing even though they may be earning low or
even negative returns on investment. Excess capacity remains functioning, and the profitability
of the healthy competitors suffers as the sick ones hang on. If the entire industry suffers from
overcapacity, it may seek government help...". This description fits the containerized ocean
transportation industry before 2004 perfectly. Until then, the carriers had a low operating margin.
The industry average operating profit as a percentage of income for 1994 to 2002 was highest
7.0% in 2000 and lowest 3.5% in 2002 (H. S. Marcus, Lecture at MIT, 2005, March 2). In 2002
the highest single shipping line had a margin of 9.5% (American Shipper, 2003). In 2004, due to
high demand resulting in capacity constraints, the operating margin is much higher than before
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for rivals in the shipping industry. This continued into the first quarter of 2003 and is not likely
to recede in the close future. Capacity expansion is however one of the most critical strategic
decision a company can make according to Porter (1980), and the great capacity expansion
shown in Figure 5 can bring problems with it that may lead to yet another bust in this industry.
Porter (1980) names many reasons that can lead to overinvestment in capacity that fit this
industry well. First there are technological reasons for overinvestment. Capacity can only be
added in large lumps, which is a description that applies to the containership capacity. There are
large economies of scale as Figure 11 shows. United Nations (2004) reports that containerships
on order are getting much larger. There are long lead times to delivery as it takes around two
years to deliver a new containership.
Figure 11
Economies of scale for containerships by route
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Second, there are structural reasons for overinvestment in capacity. The largest reason in
this category are the before mentioned high exit barriers. Another structural reason is that
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capacity leaders that want to take as much of the surging demand as possible are highly
motivated to increase their capacity.
Third, there are competitive reasons for overinvestment. Porter (1980) says that if there
are many companies in an industry without a clear market leader that are vying for a leadership
position they are likely to want to be the first to increase their capacity. Finally, there are other
reasons such as overestimation of future trends, tendency of managers to err on the side of more
capacity, and confusion due to structural changes in the industry.
The structural changes through deregulation coincide with the, at least temporary,
reduction of overcapacity. The industry shows many of the behaviors as described by Porter
(1980) that can lead to another period of overcapacity, although it may not be right around the
corner. However, this change in the market forces is also leading to new industry practices, such
as customer selection, and forcing carriers to think up new ideas to run their business. If there is
room for real options within the industry, this might therefore a good time to introduce them.
3.3.2 Threat of Substitutes
There is little threat of substitute services. Air cargo is still much more expensive, and is
used to solve a crisis or transport highly valuable products, but 90% of cargo in the world is
transported by ocean carriers (United Nations, 2004). Certain industries that have high value
goods, such as the high tech industry, use air for transportation of certain goods, but ocean
transportation is the most efficient mode of transportation for majority of goods, that need to be
shipped.
The largest threat of substitutes would probably be the shifting of manufacturing from
one area to another. It is however more likely that such a shift would just shift business from one
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segment of the industry to another. The largest threat of substitutes would probably be if
manufacturing would start shifting back from Asia to the European and American continents.
3.3.3 Supplier Power
There are four main kinds of supplies that the industry depends on: Shipyard services for
both new buildings and repairs, ports and terminals, labor, and containers.
At the start of 2004 there were 3,054 fully cellular containerships in the world (United
Nations, 2004). This, however, represents a small percentage of the total world fleet for all types
of ships used for transportation, although the containerized portion has been rising as can be seen
from Figure 12. This small portion of the total ships being used means that when there is a
shortage of containerships, getting new ones might be affected by the demand for other types of
ships also. The price of a new 100,000 dwt afromax (see appendix for definition) tanker is 71
million USD today compared with 36 million USD two years ago (R. duMoulin, Presentation at
MIT, April 11, 2005). In light of high demand for new ship buildings, shipyards are using their
leverage by taking 25% to 50% of the price of the ship upfront and being less flexible in the
configuration of the ships. Shipyards have also become more selective in the projects they take
on. They prefer to build a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) carrier, because it gives high margins
due to its advanced technology specifications. Containerships are number two on their list,
tankers are number three, and bulk carriers are the least preferred. The containership industry is
therefore not affected by shipyards account management. They are however affected by the
overall high demand that stretches upstream to diesel engines and other parts for the ship.
Furthermore, the shipyards can only hedge steel one year out and are therefore reluctant to take
orders too far into the future (R. duMoulin, Presentation at MIT, April 11, 2005).
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Figure 12
The world shipping fleet by categories.
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The high demand for ships is reflected in the cost of chartering a containership.
Chartering means that an ocean carrier enters into a contract with a ship owner to rent his ship
for a specific period of time, usually at a fixed price per day. Around half of the containerships,
less than half of the capacity, are chartered. Since 2004 it has been difficult and expensive to
charter a ship. Another evident trend is that carriers are chartering the ships for a longer period of
time as Figure 13 shows. Chartering long-term can be considered an investment, and shows that
the carrier is relying on the current situation to continue. But the duration of the chartering is not
only getting longer, every day is also getting more expensive.
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Figure 13
Trends in duration of chartering
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The Hamburg Shipbroker's Association, VHSS, is by far the largest broker of chartered
containerships with 75% of the market (United Nations, 2004). Figure 14 shows how the price
has been steadily rising over the past two years.
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Figure 14 
The Hamburg Index for Rates for chartered containerships for three months 
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To grow, the industry needs more capacity. Although shipyards are inflexible in the short 
term its capacity is influenced by the carrier's den1and for new ships, i.e. shipyards can relatively 
easily expand their operations to meet demand in the long run (H0egh, 1998). The apparent gap 
between supply and demand that has increased the lead time to 3 years from 2 years for a new 
ship might therefore be reduced over the next few years. The price for a new ship is also dictated 
by the demand for new ships (H0egh, 1998). 
The combination of a difficult chartering market and a capacity constrained shipyards 
gives these suppliers a high leverage that can influence the margins of the carriers. But ships are 
not the only supply the industry of containerized ocean transportation relies on. Ports are another 
important supply. 
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As Figure 15 shows, the largest ports in North America and Europe are lagging far
behind in terms of increased throughput between the years 2001 and 2003. This is a trend that
has caused worries in the industry, as the gap will continue to increase. The large ports in the
United States do not have plans for expansions comparable to the ports in Asia although they
have opportunities in increasing productivity, which is up to 4 times poorer than some ports in
Asia (J. Vickerman, Presentation at MIT, 2005, May 5). The ports will therefore have more
leverage and access to them could become a competitive advantage in the industry. Control over
container terminals at the ports is also critical.
Figure 15
TEU increase in throughput from 2001 to 2003 for the top twenty container
terminals in the world. Ranked in size from left to right, the largest on the left.
Terminals in Europe and North America are darkened.
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The difference between a port and a terminal is that one port can have many terminals.
The terminals can be owned and operated by companies that are customers of the port authority.
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Sometimes the carriers operate their own terminals, but usually they negotiate access with a
terminal operator. For example, unless a vessel has a reliable access to a terminal on the large
ports on the US West Coast that have become very congested, it might have to wait for days
before being able to dock. This can allow the first tier carriers that are more likely to have their
own terminals to take business from lower tier carriers that don't have this access. Terminal
access is not the only problem at the ports.
Inland access to the port is also critical. The port of Los Angeles is a good example,
where the road network to the port has huge congestion problems. The capacity to unload ships
is more than the capacity to drive the containers out of the port. The same capacity constraint
applies to the railway system: The average train speed at UP for the first eleven weeks of 2005 is
5% lower than for the same period of 2004 (ProgressiveRailroading.com, 2005). This is a part of
a long-term overall trend in the US, and will continue as the plans for transportation
infrastructure's capacity do not match the forecast growth in freight transport (Transportation
Research Board, 2003). In addition, ports need to secure more than one way of transportation to
and from them. There is the risk of single point of failure to have only one vendor to take care of
transportation from a port, e.g. Canadian national railroad in Halifax (P. Keller, Presentation at
MIT, 2005, March 7). Adding to the problem are unresolved issues with unions at the ports, such
as the fact that the gates for the trailers are open 8 to 10 hours per day while containers are being
unloaded around the clock.
Containers are an important supply factor, since the container is the prerequisite for a
shipment. Due to the imbalance in volumes over lanes to and from China, and due to cheaper
labor and material over 90% of containers are produced in China (United Nations, 2004). Of the
containers produced, 90% are of standard sizes and function, and the rest are mostly refrigerated
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containers, so called reefers. Production of containers does not seem to be a problem. The only
reported problem is what to do with containers when they arrive from Asia. (United Nations,
2005).
Figure 16
Annual production of containters, total and by region.
Tho" T I Thougand Th 1
2..
2,'
500r .3
000
000
Soo
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 0 LL
2001 20u. 2003
Source: United Nations (2004).
The description in this section might give the immediate feeling that supplier power was
high. There are however few arguments that go against that. First, the description of shipyards
and charting focused on the boom part of the business cycle. Only two years ago the industry
was in a bust, which is a time when shipyards are bidding low to get contracts, and when
shipbrokers may be stuck with unchartered ships. Second, the description of the ports focused on
the most congested ports, where their leverage is the greatest. Third, there is a difference in the
leverage of three tiers of carriers. The imbalance in the power of the suppliers therefore leads it
to being rated as medium.
3.3.4 Customer Power
For a typical shipper the containerized ocean transportation accounts for the 1% to 1.5%
of the total cost of the product (Carr, 1998). Although the percentage of the transportation cost of
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the total price of product decreases the higher the value of the cargo being transported, any
savings that can be achieved in the transportation are reflected in the shippers operating margins.
However, transportation cost may not be the shipper's largest concern.
For many shippers, the cost of lost sales due to missed shipments outweighs the cost of
the transportation itself. The shippers are also changing: they are getting larger, and therefore
carry more leverage. The 80/20 rule is applicable: 80% of the cargo comes from 20% of the
customers (P. Keller, Presentation at MIT, 2005, March 7). Furthermore, smaller shippers go
through NVOCCs (defined at the start of this chapter) that function as a large shipper towards the
carrier, having leverage of a large shipper through the consolidation of shipments. Due to
potential high cost of lost sales, there is an opportunity for a carrier to offer services that add
value to the shipper that is more important than marginal changes in the rates themselves.
The first-tier carriers are in a strong position to enter into a service contract that is more
than shipping a container door-to-door. In such a case, a shipper that wanted out of a contract
would not only need to change four or five legs, which can be very difficult (P. Keller,
Presentation at MIT, 2005, March 7). It would also be losing the value added by such a contract.
An example of such value adding operating ties is Just-in-time 1I (JIT II), so called by Bose Inc.
American Presidents Line (APL) has a full time employee working from within Bose Inc. The
APL employee has full access to APL's freight system and his role is to make sure that Bose Inc.
gets its shipments on time, that Bose Inc. has the visibility and flexibility to change the direction
or priority of shipments, both of supplies and finished products, that are already underway
(Deierlein, 2000). The operations of a huge shipper can also affect the operations of other
shippers.
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It is forecast that in 2008 Wal-Mart will ship 2 million TEUs, Target 800 thousand, and
HomeDepot 800 thousand. Wal-Mart decided in 2004 that it would have its peak season
containerized cargo that goes through Southern California shipped to them in September and
October instead of spreading it over more months, thereby taking up capacity smaller shippers
and NVOCCs needed during these months. (Mongelluzzo, 2004, September 6). That Wal-Mart
could do this, shows the leverage some large shippers have.
Another threat identified by Porter (1980) is backward integration by the customer, in this
case the shipper. This became a source of debate in 2004 when the rumor spread that Wal-Mart
intended to buy APL. Although the rumor proved false, the idea of a large importer taking over
the ocean transportation's part of its supply chain is still cause for discussion. One view
identifies it as an opportunity for a shipper (Mongelluzzo, 2004), while another view says it has
been done before: The shipper R.J. Reynolds owned the carrier Sea-Land, which suffered from
its ownership, because the shipper's competitors wouldn't use it, and the shipper itself used it as
leverage when negotiating with other carriers. It was eventually spun off, and has now merged
with A.P. Moller Group (Ferrulli, 2005).
Shipper's position on conferences offers an insight into the different leverage of larger
and smaller shippers. Just as was pointed out in the section on rivalry in this chapter, being a
large carrier in the conference system of fixed pricing did not offer the same strategic advantage
of being large in a free pricing environment. Looking at this from the shipper's perspective the
conference system was offering the same price to large and small shipper's alike. It is therefore
not surprising that according to Sjostrom (2004) it seems as smaller shippers favor the
conferences while the larger shippers oppose them. This does however not fit with the
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unequivocal opposition to the conferences that the American and European Shipper associations
voiced in response to the European Commissions white paper on banning conferences.
It was suggested in the section on rivalry that carriers could either try to make the most of
current boom in the industry through traditional practices or use the opportunity to lead changes
in the system. Similarly, it can be claimed that during the years after deregulation started in
1998, the shippers missed an opportunity during the bust part of the business cycle, to lead value
adding changes in the system, using instead the opportunity to keep ocean carriers margins
down. This was a missed opportunity that they are now paying for through higher transportation
costs.
3.3.5 Barriers to Entry
This industry follows a boom and bust cycle. In either case there are large capital
investment barriers. In a boom, the ships are expensive to buy or charter. In a bust, even though
the ships can be very cheap to buy or charter, the operating margins are also very low and make
it both undesirable and hard to enter the market. The likeliest scenario of a new large competitor
entering the industry is if an NVOCC (defined at the start of this chapter) manages to use
confidential contracts to increase in size and offer more flexible service at a competitive price
through its connections. Another possible scenario is smaller carriers merging to create more
serious competitor, using its already existing network to expand. A recent merger of smaller
carriers, e.g., is the takeover of the Dutch carrier Geest North Sealine by the Icelandic carrier
Samskip. This takeover took place in March 2005 and created one of the largest carriers
operating within Europe (Samskip, 2005).
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Section 3.3.3 describes congestion at ports and in container terminals. This congestion
can make it difficult for a newcomer in the industry to get access to the space he needs, thus
acting as a barrier to entry.
Conferences have been used to prevent new entrants into the market. Sjostrom (2004)
describes their main tool as being underbidding, use of loyalty contracts, and capacity. Price
differentiation used by conferences, according to Sjostrom (2004), on the other hand lower the
barrier to entry.
Underbidding is an obvious barrier to entry. If a carrier starts operating outside of a
conference the conference either drops its price below what is sustainable for the new entrant, or
it dispatches a ship to compete on another route where the new entrant operates. There is
however no conclusive evidence that this has been the case (Sjostrom, 2004).
Loyalty contracts are another obvious barrier to entry. There are two types of such
contracts in the industry: the first one punishes the shipper if it does business outside the
conference, and the other one gives backward discounts, i.e. if a shipper sticks to a conference
for duration B, it receives discount for the business done for duration A, where A comes before
B. This might not change if the conference disappears as loyalty contracts may continue to be a
strong tool for a single carrier to lock in its business (Sjostrom, 2004).
Apart from fixing prices the conferences have rules for minimum and maximum capacity
for their members. In this case the maximum capacity is used to create imbalance in the supply
and demand, thus keeping prices from reaching the economic optimum. On the other hand the
conferences may have minimum capacity rule for new members to the conference, if the law
forces them to take new entrants, which forces new entrants to have more capacity than is
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efficient, thus pressing them to raise their prices if they want to participate in the market
(Sjostrom, 2004).
Conferences have long been suspected of price differentiation according to the value of
the product being shipped. Evidence of this has however not been conclusive. What is known,
however, is that the conference tariffs price some products higher than others, which in turn
makes it easier for a new entrant to offer competitive prices for certain kinds of products. This
originates from the time before the containers but has not changed despite the fact that
containerization decreases the difference between handling valuable shipments and cheaper
shipments. In this case, the actions of the conferences act to lower the barrier of entry.
There are large barriers to entry into the first-tier carrier's market segment. The greatest
threat is that smaller carriers will merge to become more serious competitors. As there is no one
carrier that dominates the industry - A.P. Moller Group is the largest one with 10% of the world
TEU capacity - there are likely to be mergers, especially between companies of different
nationalities. The Singapore NOL acquisition of APL is an example of that (Keller, 2005,
February 28). Mergers of first-tier carriers would increase the carriers' strength and diminish
their need to participate in conferences. Overall, it is not complicated to charter a ship and during
a boom it might be appealing to outsiders. During a boom however the price of chartering a ship
increases drastically (see Figure 14) thus raising the capital barrier to entry. During a bust, it is
easy to enter the market, but since the operating margins are not high then, it is not so appealing.
The likeliest scenario of a newcomer in the industry is if someone identifies a need in a specific
area that is not being met by existing carriers. If that proves to be successful, it may prove as a
stepping stone into other markets, much as Samskip, a small Icelandic carrier, has become one of
the largest carriers within Europe, after having successfully serviced the small market of Iceland.
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3.4 Uncertainty in Containerized Ocean
Transportation
There are many different types of uncertainty that affect the industry, some of the main
ones being uncertainty in demand, fuel prices, transit time, currency, congestion, business cycle,
demurrage, handling fees, and inland transportation costs.
One of the recurring themes in supply chain management literature is how difficult it is to
forecast demand. This applies both to new product introduction as well as more mature markets
like for clothing. The way that the carrier guards against this uncertainty is by having the shipper
guarantee a minimum quantity commitment (MQC). During times of excess capacity these
MQCs are a small part of the real volume shipped, but rises during times of under-capacity and
in 2004 the MQC came close to the actual volume shipped. Currently, according to discussions
at CTL (2005), the prevalent practice today is that of bidding and tendering. A shipper asks
several carriers for a bid over specific volume over lanes, the carrier hands in the bids, the
shipper optimizes the bids, and finally tenders the volume to carriers. Harding (2005) offers a
good explanation of this process and looks into how the optimization matches the reality of
planned and unplanned shipments. There does, however, not be much of an intertwined operating
cooperation between shippers and carriers to manage the demand (see section 4.3), despite one
successful attempt at this, JIT II that is described in section 3.3.4.
Fuel prices are highly volatile. Although there are advanced mechanisms in the financial
markets to hedge against these fuel price fluctuations, bunker surcharges are still the norm.
Figure 17 shows fuel fluctuations over a 7 year period.
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Figure 17
Oil prices. The Figure shows clearly the fluctuations from day to day and also over
longer periods of time.
Transit time can be sensitive for some shippers but not for others. First-tier carriers try to
meet the transit time within a window of hours according to an industry practitioner. Some
shippers however delay to pick up their containers. The time a container spends in a destination
terminal is called a demurrage. Long demurrage can take up valuable space in an already
congested terminal, which has led carriers to start charging a demurrage fee for late pickup. A
fee like this shows an understanding that keeping the container in the terminal has value, and
therefore provides the right incentive for the shipper to pick it up.
Currency fluctuation can severely affect the operating margins of carriers. A.P. M6ller
(2005) discusses this in some detail, explaining that their margins are good despite most of their
income being in US dollars, which was weak during 2004, and most of their cost being in
currencies that were very strong relative to the US dollar. Carriers use a Currency surcharge,
CAF, to shift this uncertainty over to shippers.
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Congestion in ports is now becoming a greater uncertainty leading to longer waiting
times and even rerouting. A. Westhoff (Interview, 2005, March 31) explained how CSX has been
receiving more traffic through the eastern ports after a strike closed down the ports on the west
coast in 2002. Costs of this are handed over to the shipper in the form of a congestion surcharge.
Handling fees and cost of inland transportation to ports, and changes in spot prices of feeders are
also charged to the shipper in the form an extra charge (Transpacific Stabilization Agreement,
2005). United Nations (2004) cites examples where shippers are charged extra for each container
that is selected for a security check.
The uncertainties described above can be split into two categories: specific to the industry
and exogenous to the industry. These two types of uncertainties need to be dealt with in different
ways as is discussed in chapter 4.
3.5 Times are Changing
This chapter started by introducing the industry, explaining the main historical facts, and
providing an understanding of why the industry practices are the way they are. It then went on to
describe the forces at work in the industry, how players interact, and what uncertainties they are
facing. This discussion leads to the following conclusions.
Deregulation has created an environment that is leading to different industry practices.
These changes are happening slowly because during the bust in the industry up to 2003, shippers
took advantage it of it, pressing price down, forcing carriers to defend themselves through the
familiar mechanism of conferences. In the boom in the industry since 2003 the tables have turned
and the carriers are using their familiar mechanisms to force prices up. During times of boom the
structure of the industry leads to over-investment in containership capacity, which again is likely
to lead to another bust. The main ports in the US are heavily congested and their capacity
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expansions is lagging far behind the ports in Asia and lagging behind the capacity expansion of
the containership fleet. Many of the uncertainties facing shippers and carriers stem from port
operations. These uncertainties are industry specific and should therefore be manageable through
behavioral change. Another group of uncertainties is exogenous to the industry and needs to be
dealt with through another mechanism.
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4 Managing Uncertainty
through Ocean
Transportation Contracting
Is it possible to manage the uncertainties through contracting? This chapter suggests ways
to do so. First, it starts by describing how contracts are set up today (section 4.1). It then explains
new ideas that a large ocean carrier has set forth for new types of contracts (4.2). Before moving
on to concrete suggestions of what to do, the concept of "intercompany operating ties" (Byrnes
& Shapiro, 1991) is introduced (section 4.3). In section 4.4 the industry specific uncertainties are
addressed and a real options approach is suggested. Section 4.5 introduces how shipping
derivatives for dry and wet bulk are already being used to hedge against uncertainties. The last
part (section 4.6) suggests a futures market in order to hedge against uncertainty that is
exogenous to the industry of containerized ocean transportation.
4.1 Contracts Today
This section is based on interviews with industry practitioners from both the carrier and
shipper sides.
Most long term contracts in the containership industry have a one year cycle that starts on
the first of May. They are comprised of three parts: the contract itself including line items, a bill
of lading that is issued for each shipment, and tariffs that are published officially. The contracts
are based on a specific route, and specify the price per container, plus various surcharges, such as
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a fuel surcharge (called bunker charge), customs, handling, currency adjustments factor (CAF),
peak season surcharge (PSS), and a general rate increase recommended by the liner's conference
(GRI). The line items include the origin of a shipment, final destination, type of container, size of
shipment, quantity, the port of load (the port the ship leaves from), information on transportation
from harbour to inland point, frequency of shipments, day of week it is shipped, transit time in #
of days, and service.
The shippers commit to a minimum quantity commitment (MQC), but in reality the
carriers generally do not seek monetary liabilities if a large customer doesn't fulfil the MQC.
The process leading up to the contract starts with the bidding. The shipper sends out data
to anywhere from a handful to 50 carriers. The carriers offer a price and volume over different
ports. The carriers usually provide prices according to where they want to win the business. This
process creates a lot of data; for 1000 line items a shipper might receive bids from 10 carriers,
which makes 10,000 records of data, each of which has different information, e.g. different ports
for the same good.
Carrier performance weighs heavily when the shipper decides on volume allocation.
These are usually based on a feeling of historic performance and are not necessarily hard metrics.
The shipper has accurate cost information, e.g. it knows how much each day in transit costs
(inventory cost). The optimization is therefore not only based on the price the carrier offers but
monetary values are attached to each day in transit. This allocation of cost in the optimization
process does however not enter into the contract.
The contract year starts on May 1 every year. The carrier in general has more leverage in
2004 and 2005 because of capacity constraints, which resulted in contracts being made earlier
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this year than before, many of them were finished in January according to industry practitioners
interviewed.
Contract management on the carrier's side consists of the carrier updating its surcharges
and tariffs. Known changes to demand are taken into account. Larger shippers like Wal-Mart and
Proctor & Gamble can modify contracts on a daily basis while smaller shippers would do few
changes per month. New lanes might be added. Amendments to a contract can consist of a term
change, renegotiation of items, capacity commitments, line item changes, new equipment types
(i.e. type of containers), and a carrier's change of route.
4.1.1 Contract Structure
A contract is typically comprised of three things: a standard boiler plate, notes and terms
and ancilliaries.
The standard boiler plate is something that is known industry wide and protects the rights
of the carriers and the shippers. The rate matrix is, however, negotiated case by case and is
included in an appendix that is attached to the boiler plate. The appendix also includes specific
numbers to the contract, such as the exact duration. The boiler plate then has standard clauses
that define how the information in the appendix are interpreted. The boiler plate contract
typically has the following items:
- Contract parties, i.e. who the shipper and carrier are.
- Governing tariffs, i.e. the carrier's freight tariffs are a part of the contract.
- Contract term, i.e. how the contract term is defined, and which shipments fall within
it.
- Cargo and scope, i.e. which shipments the shipper can tender to the carrier and from
where, for the rates specified in the contract.
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- Minimum quantity commitment (MQC).
- Contract rates, i.e. what the rates in the appendix include and what they do not
include.
- Carrier service commitment, i.e. which shipments the carrier is committed to
transporting and which shipments it is not. Normally, the carrier commits to
transporting the MQC and can choose to transport shipments above the MQC.
- Verification of contract carryings. This clause commits the shipper to include the
contract number on all bills of ladings, which makes it possible for the carrier to
manage the contract.
- Force majeure.
- Liquidated damages.
- Termination and cancellation.
- Bills of lading, i.e. the boiler plate makes sure that the bill of lading is a part of the
contract.
- Contract records, i.e. which records can be used to measure the performance under
the contract.
Notes and Terms are statements that affect the billing. They can exempt the shipper from
some tariffs, but tariffs are automatically a part of the contract unless otherwise specified. The
terms define the scope of the contract, for example free time the shipper has in the terminal. A
typical term would be that the shipper has 5 days free time from the arrival of a container in the
destination terminal. If it picks the container up in 7 days it incurrs 2 days demurrage payments.
The contract also includes information about affiliates, i.e. companies that can ship on behalf of
the shipper.
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Three years ago the shippers could name affiliates and the carrier would accept them
without a question. This has changed due to security reasons. Now the carriers have to know
exactly who the affiliate shipping on behalf of the shipper is. Carriers require official address and
proof of financial affiliation to reduce the carriers liability.
Ancilliaries are charges that come on top of the base rate. Origin side arbitraries are the
most common. An example of an origin side ancilliary is the following. A shipper and a carrier
make an agreement of shipping goods from Shanghai through the Hong Kong port to the US.
The Transpacific Stabilization Agreement (TSA) is a forum that the main carriers on this route
use to assess the ancilliary charges, which are said to represent price fluctuations that the carrier
cannot control. The TSA publishes these assesments. If the TSA assesses the ancilliary handling
charge at the port of Hong Kong to be USD 200, the carrier charges the shipper USD 200 for
each container travelling through Hong Kong. There are some destination side ancilliaries, but
they are less common.
The TSA has the following ancillary charges (Transpacific Stabilization Agreement,
2005):
- Bunker Fuel, which compensates for fuel price fluctuations,
- Congestion, which compensates for delays and rerouting of cargo due to port
congestion,
- Currency, which compensates for currency fluctuations in a local currency relative
to the contract currency,
- Feeder, which compensates for spot price increases of feeder services,
- War Risk, which compensates for higher insurance fees and rescheduling in
countries, where there is a risk of armed conflict,
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- Alameda Corridor, which compensates for a fee the railroads charge for inland
transportation via Southern California to cover the cost of the Alameda Corridor
facility.
- Chassis Usage, which compensates for a chassis the carrier may provide in addition
to the standard container equipment,
- Container Service, which compensates for the cleaning and maintenance of a
container after use,
- Documentation Fee, which compensates the carrier for work due to increased
magnitude and complexity of paperwork,
- Hazardous Rail Security, which compensates for inland rail transportation of
hazardous material,
- Panama Canal, which covers the fee for passing through the Panama Canal,
- Suez Canal, which covers the fee for passing through the Suez Canal,
- Terminal Handling, which covers the cost of handling the container after it arrives at
the port of origin until it is placed on the ship (the charge varies by ports),
- Detention, which compensates for the shipper's use of the container equipment after
the shipment has been delivered,
- Demurrage, which compensates for every day the shipper delays to pick the
container up from the destination terminal,
- Drayage, which compensates for the handling of the container at the port of
destination until it is picked up by the shipper, and
- Hazardous Cargo, which compensates for the handling of hazardous cargo.
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4.1.2 Contract Management
For first-tier carriers, almost all of the cargo moves on service contracts. Carriers use
service contract number as primary key to track volume, timings, revenues, costs, etc. that allows
the carrier to see which contracts are the most profitable and which contracts are having
problems. A key indicator is revenue per TEU. Another trend that a carrier practitioner
confirmed in an interview to have noticed, is that seasonal variations are becoming less drastic as
shippers use inventory policies to smooth them out. This was not confirmed in conversations
with shippers, apart from one large shipper that said it would not consider changing its inventory
policy in order to smooth out peaks in transportation. One way that carriers use to mitigate
seasonal variations is to negotiate sub-MQCs that guarantee the carrier some volume over the
low season, say from December to April, in return for a guaranteed capacity to the shipper over
peak season. There is also a peak season charge that in the beginning of 2005 was $400 per FEU
for trans-pacific shipements. Surcharges were discussed in some detail in section 3.4.
The shippers generally measure their fulfillment of MQC and the carriers' service level.
A large retailer in the US that uses seven ocean carriers measures every week how they are doing
compared to the MQC promised to each carrier. From the total position against the carrier, the
shipper creates a commitment schedule for the upcoming week. The same retailer measures the
performance of its carriers qualitatively, giving five qualifications: Excellent, Very Good, Good,
Fair, and Poor. The categories that are measured are Operational Performance, Communication,
Technology, and Management Support.
Operational Performance is based on whether document handling is quick and correct,
condition of equipment, availability of equipment, ability to meet transit time, ability to meet
published vessel schedule, and ability to follow up on in-transit relays. Communication is based
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on how readily available customer service is and how courteous phone contact by employees at
all levels is. Technology is rating is based on carrier's pro-active offering of new technology and
responsiveness to technology requests. Management support is based on the flexibility of the
carrier to help and the local knowledge of consignee business in the US.
4.2 Trends in Contracting
The industry deregulation described in chapter 3 has started to influence the way industry
players think in terms of contracting. Ideas about new ways to make contracts were put forth in a
presentation by a large first-tier ocean carrier in the US. They want to adopt a shared-risk
relationship with the shipper and take a challenge-everything approach. In the presentation four
new types of contracts were suggested.
The first type is a contract where the shipper pays at the beginning of each month a fixed
amount based on a discounted market price. This will fix the shippers cost for that month and
give him protected space for that time period. This is similar to a short-term forward contract,
apart from the timing of the settlement. Forward contracts are discussed in detail in section 4.5.
The second type is a multi-year contract, with fixed dates for base rate adjustments,
which would have a cap. This would reduce negotiation costs and provide some base rate
stability, although there would continue to be instability due to surcharges.
The third type has a payment model where the shipper pays the carrier a fixed amount
every month for eleven months, but on the twelfth month there is a settlement for the whole year.
This might reduce administrative cost, make budgeting simpler, but also lead to troubles in the
twelfth month due to outstanding disputes over incidents that happened too long ago to be easily
settled.
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The fourth type is a logistics contract where the ocean carrier would take over the
responsibility of the whole transportation phase, door-to-door, for a fixed rate.
These ideas are put forward here to give the reader a sense of what is possible and that
carriers have started to think about an approach to contracting that challenges the traditional way
of doing business. The ideas, however, do not address tying the operations of the shipper and the
carrier together to remove inefficiencies, a concept that is described in the next section.
4.3 Managing Uncertainty through Intercompany
Operating Ties
Shippers frequently mention relationship building with the carriers to help manage
capacity and demand better (CTL, 2005). Byrnes and Shapiro (1991) describes one form of such
cooperation that it calls "intercompany operating ties". It however points out that in order to
unlock value in the channel the intercompany operating ties must stretch through the whole
channel. The paper focuses on the management of the product flow, eliminating excess inventory
and lack of information sharing. From this perspective the container can be defined as the
product that is "manufactured" when it is filled for shipment. Instead of building huge yards to
carry thousands of containers, in effect creating a huge buffer inventory, it is conceivable to
think of a system where the containers flow through the system without ever stopping in an
inventory buffer. This means that in order to unlock value in the channel that is composed of
shipper - inland transportation -port - carrier -port - inland transportation - receiver the
whole channel would need to be considered.
The largest obstacles to creating these operating ties throughout the channel are,
according to Byrnes and Shapiro (1991), lack of awareness of root causes of a problem, lack of
data, and organizational structure. Any successful attempt at "intercompany operating ties" is
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dependent on the incentive structure in the channel. The incentive structure within containerized
ocean transportation does not encourage the channel partners to seek out and eliminate
uncertainties. Figure 18 describes how the incentives in the industry of containerized ocean
transportation are aligned today and introduces a concept this thesis chooses to call an incentive
barrier.
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The incentive barrier is created when company A is charged with a fee that it cannot do
anything about. A fee it has to pay for a situation it is not in control of, but is not significant
enough for it to change its behavior thereby threatening company B that is charging the fee. The
cost that the fee is meant to cover does not originate with company B, but with company C,
which has some kind of a situation incurring extra cost. What this implies is that since B knows
that it can pass the extra cost on to A, it is willing to accept the extra charge from C. Although a
fee can sometimes be a solution it is less so if the recipient of the fee has no alternatives to react
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to it. If C was more restricted in solving its inefficiency problems through an extra charge, it
would have more of an incentive to resolve the root causes of the problem.
The list of ancillary charges in section 4.1.1 has examples of this, such as the congestion
charge to compensate for rerouting of containers, the feeder charge, the terminal handling
charge, and the drayage charge.
Focusing on eliminating inefficiencies that create industry specific uncertainties may
make everyone much better off than they are today. A starting point in creating the right
incentive is to price things according to their value. Real options can help there as section 4.4
describes.
4.4 Defining Real Options for the Containerized
Ocean Transportation
What kinds of options are applicable in cpntainerized ocean transportation? The
following sections list situations based on the uncertainties listed in section 3.4 and suggest a real
options approach to pricing them. Some of the ideas below suggest pricing for things that are not
being charged for in the industry today. These suggestions are however a part of a larger
suggestion that is aimed at eliminating many of the inefficiencies that are leading to high costs.
This thesis states that unless players in the industry realize the costs involved in certain
behaviors, they are unlikely to change.
4.4.1 An Option to Ship More
Description: A shipper commits to shipping X number of containers with a specific carrier but
has the right to ship more. Today the shipper can request to ship more than the MQC, but the
carrier has the right to refuse the shipment.
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Type of option: This situation describes a call option that the shipper has. He has the right but
not the obligation to ship more than X containers.
Strike price: The option could allow him to ship the containers for the same price and with the
same service level as the other containers, or it could give him different rights. In any case, the
cost of shipping the extra container is the strike price.
Price of the option: Today the shipper pays for this option by taking more risk with a higher
MQC, since, according to an industry practitioner, carriers are more likely to take extra cargo
from those who are willing to commit more of their shipments than others. The price of
exercising the option today is however 0. In time of under capacity this option clearly has a value
to the shipper. If the shipper had to pay for the option directly it would have more incentive to
cooperate with the carrier to better manage the transportation orders.
4.4.2 An Option to Ship Less
Description: A shipper commits to shipping X number of containers but can ship less.
Type of option: This situation describes a put option that the shipper has. He has the right but
not the obligation to ship less than X containers.
Strike price: It could either be zero, i.e. the shipper doesn't pay for shipments it doesn't ship, or
it could be at a price per container.
Price of the option: Today the shipper has this option for free according to an industry
practitioner, who said that if shippers didn't meet their MQCs the carrier wouldn't go after the
penalty. If, however, it became industry practice for carriers to seek payment for committed
shipments that weren't shipped, this option would have a value, for example to a shipper that is
introducing a new product and wants to err on the higher side of demand.
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4.4.3 An Option to Bump
Description: A carrier commits to shipping a certain volume, but has the right to bump
containers, i.e. to ship them later than promised (bumping is also called rolling).
Type of option: This is a put option, the carrier has the right but not the obligation to get out of a
bad situation.
Strike price: The strike price could either be zero, or a price per container. The only strike price
today is an uncomfortable phone call to the shipper telling him that the shipment will arrive late.
Price of the option: Today the carrier has the free option to bump containers. In times of under-
capacity the right to bump containers has obvious value. As Pompeo and Sapountzis (2002)
points out, the shippers have different sensitivity to the bumping. The shipper that doesn't intend
to pick its container up in the delivery terminal until at the last possible moment, might be happy
to sell the carrier an option to bump its container for a week. Making the carrier feel that
bumping has value should lead to a different behavior, since the carrier would know which
containers it could bump, and a telephone call to tell the shipper that it has excercised its option
is easier than a telephone call to tell him that you have violated the contract.
4.4.4 An Option to Raise Charges
Description: Handling charges go up in a port that a shipment passes through. The carrier has
the right but not the obligation to raise the handling surcharge.
Type of option: This is a call option.
Strike price: This is in effect an option with no strike price.
Price of the option: The carrier should be aware that being able to increase handling charges has
value, and the shipper should understand how much it gains by giving that option away.
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4.4.5 An Option to Delay Pick-up
Description: Due to the capacity constraints of container terminals some terminal operators have
started to charge a demurrage fee if the container is not picked up from the terminal before a
negotiated number of days. It may seem farfetched to represent a fee as a real option. But
whether they are considered to be the same or separate, the end result is that the shipper feels that
not picking the container up has value. For a major train operator in the US, the introduction of
demurrage fees relieved the congestion in its terminals that had become a severe operational
problem, with trainloads of containers passing by terminals because there was no room for the
containers.
Type of option: Demurrage fee can be represented as series of call options the shipper has to
keep the container in the terminal. Keeping the container there one extra day gives you the right
but not the obligation to keep it there another day.
Strike price: The fee charged per extra day.
Price of the option: A shipper that has capacity problems at its facilities may see value in
delaying the picking up of a container.
4.4.6 An Option to Cancel Contracts
Description: A carrier builds or contracts more terminal space than it needs and rents the excess
capacity to other carriers. It then has the right but not the obligation to cancel the agreements
with the other carriers if it needs more space.
Type of option: This is a call option.
Strike price: This is a real option which has a strike price of zero, unless there is a penalty for
canceling the contract.
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Price of the option: The price of the option may be a higher initial investment or having over-
capacity that may be impossible to rent out.
4.4.7 An Option to Change the Destination
Description: A container ship has to wait for an access to a port on the West Coast of USA due
to capacity constraints or a strike. It changes directions and goes to a port on the East Coast. This
is an option. The carrier has the right but not the obligation to switch ports. This is exactly what
happened during a strike on the US West Coast Ports in 2002. Many carriers decided to sail
directly to ports on the East Coast (A. Westhoff, Interview, 2005, March 31).
Type of option: This is a call option.
Strike price: The strike price is the cost of sailing to the East Coast.
Price of the option: The price of the option could be loss of economies of scale for operating a
ship that can pass through the Panama Canal.
4.4.8 An Option to Reroute
Description: A carrier and a shipper negotiate a door-to-door contract. The carrier can decide
the route the shipments take. The carrier then has the option to go through different ports, in
effect has the flexibility to choose the most efficient means of transportation.
Type of option: This provides the carrier with options that de Neufville (2004) calls "in the
system". That means that the system is fixed, the carrier still has to pick the shipment up and
deliver it, but can have contracts with different ports, different inland carriers, and different
terminal operators, which gives it flexibility.
Strike price: The strike price is the cost and effort needed to reroute the shipment.
Price of the option: The flexibility to make the most use of the system, not only through
planning, but also through execution.
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4.4.9 An Option to Buy Out
Description: A shipper and a carrier form a joint venture for some defined shipments. They
share the ownership of the joint venture and therefore have the incentive to make it as profitable
as possible. The shipper or the carrier could then have the option to buy the partner out at a
certain time, as explained in chapter 2.
Type of option: This is a call option.
Strike price: The cost of buying the partner out.
Price of the option: The cost of setting up a joint venture.
4.4.10 An Option to Switch
Description: This option is included here although it is from the air transportation industry. A
parcel service and an airline make a stand-by agreement. In this case the airline has an aircraft
standby for the parcel service at certain predetermined times. The parcel service pays the airline
a certain fee per year, and guarantees it a minimum of flight hours. In return the parcel service
has the right not to use the standby aircraft.
Type of option: From the parcel service side, this would be a put option, as they don't have to
pay for a flight they don't need. They get out of a bad situation.
Strike price: The strike price is cost of having the airplane fly each time it is used.
Price of the option: The cost of having the airplane stand by.
4.4.11 An Option to Expand the Infrastructure
Description: One of the more traditional ways of thinking about real options is in the planning
of infrastructure projects in light of high uncertainty of forecast demand. De Neufville (2004)
describes how a real options approach helped in making decisions about a large new airport in
South-America. Instead of looking at the infrastructure problem as a one large inseparable
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project it is separated into phases. For example, even though a decision has not been made to
build the airport, the process of securing land and acquiring building licenses, a process
stretching over years, can be started, so that if demand for the airport evolves as forecast the
project managers have the right, but not the obligation, to build it. A similar approach is
applicable to the development of ports, roads and rail. Instead of thinking of the expansion of a
port as a one large inseparable project, the port might have all licenses and land prepared for
construction, if demand develops as forecast.
Type of option: Call option to expand.
Strike price: The cost of building the expansion.
Price of the option: The price of the option is the cost of a preparation process, that may not be
utilized.
4.4.12 An Option to Build
Description: Shipyards sell options for newbuildings of ships. In a boom and bust industry
where the value of a ship can double over one or two years as R. DuMoulin (Presentation at
MIT, April 11, 2005) pointed out, the value of a shipbuilding options should be high. The
shipyards should therefore not only look at shipbuilding options as a way to attract customers,
but rather as the selling of a strategic asset.
Type of option: A call option to build a ship.
Strike price: The cost of building the ship.
Price of the option: The high uncertainty in a boom and bust industry should lead to a high price
of the option. The shipyards have traditionally put a too low price on the options (Hoegh, 1998),
so if demand soars, the owners of the options stand to gain a lot.
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4.4.13 An Option to Ship More through Dual Sourcing
Description: A shipper uses Hewlett Packard's concept of dual sourcing (Billington, 2002). He
contracts 90% of its estimated shipments to one carrier and reaps the benefits of a long term
contract. He contracts 10% of its estimated shipments to another carrier that has higher price but
guarantees delivery of extra orders.
Type of option: An option to expand.
Strike price: The price per extra container shipped.
Price of the option: The price of paying more for 10% of the shipments, as well as the cost of
having to deal with two suppliers instead of one supplier.
4.4.14 Pricing Flexibility
This section has proposed new ways of pricing flexibility. It does not mean that prices
should go up. It means that shippers and carriers will be better off and in a better position to
manage their business if they know where the value in the system is. These are however not
methods that can mitigate exogenous uncertainties. The next section takes up that issue which
leads the discussion back to financial derivatives.
4.5 Hedging with Shipping Derivatives
Trading of derivatives for dry and wet bulk shipping rates increased by 70% to USD 30
billion between the years 2003 and 2004, and is forecast to increase by another 70% from 2004
to 2005. This does however not necessarily mean that there is a market for derivatives in the
containership industry. The dry and wet bulk transportation prices are linked to the prices of the
commodities being shipped. There is a strong market for derivatives of those commodities,
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which has led derivatives traders to try to hedge against the volatility of the transportation part of
the commodity (Pierron, 2005).
Figure 19
Baltic Dry Index January 1985 to April 2005
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Source: Baltic Exchange (2005)
However, just as in dry and wet bulk there is price volatility for containerized freight, as
can be seen in Figure 20, which might attract interest in derivatives from those that want to
hedge against this volatility.
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Figure 20
Monthly Liner Freight Index for incoming and outgoing containers for the liner
ports from Antwerpen in Belgium to Hamburg in Germany.
Source: United Nations (2004)
4.6 Spot Prices - Forwards - Futures
There is a clear difference between spot contracts, forward contracts and futures
contracts. Spot contracts are short-term contracts that are based on the price on the market at the
exact time the contract is made. Spot contracts are over the counter contracts, i.e. a contract
unique to the parties to the contract.
Forward contracts are mid and long term contracts, for example from one month up to a
year, that are non standardized over the counter contracts between two partners. The parties fix
the price for a future transaction and exchange the money at the time of the transaction. Forward
contracts are an indicator of what industry companies expect the price to be at a future date.
Futures contract is a completely standardized contract that is managed by an exchange
that guarantees their payments through a clearing house. How futures work is best explained by
an example. On April 1, a shipper buys a future contract for USD 200,000 for the shipment on
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September 1 of 100 containers from Hong Kong to Long Beach. The price has been set by the
exchange. To enable this business the shipper has to create a margin account that will be used for
the marked-to-market transactions. In this example it is assumed that the margin account is 10%,
i.e. the shipper puts USD 20,000 into the account. On April 2, the Exchange's rate for its futures
contract is USD 196,000. This means that USD 4,000 are removed from the margin account. On
April 3, the Exchange's rate for its futures contract is USD 195,000, so a further USD 1,000 are
removed from the margin account. On April 3, the Exchange's rate for its futures contract is
USD 199,000, so USD 3000 are added to its account. And so on. The margin account may have
to be refilled if the futures rate goes beneath a pre-specified threshold. If the shipper intends to
use the 100 container spaces the future contracts specifies, it simply keeps the contract until the
settlement date.
If, however, the shipper does not wish to use the 100 container spaces it can decide to
close out its position by neutralizing its agreement, i.e. it sells (shorts) a shipment on September
1 of 100 containers from Hong Kong to Long Beach. It is this feature that allows speculators to
enter into futures contracts without requiring the service they specify. Having speculators in the
futures market is necessary to provide the liquidity needed.
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Difference between
Figure 21
spot, forward and futures markets.
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Forward Freight Agreements (FFAs) are flexible contracts that shippers and carriers of
dry and wet bulk do in order to hedge against future changes in spot prices. The terms of the
contract include the lane, time of shipment, volume, and the agreed forward rate. The settlement
is then done against an independent index, such as the one published by the Baltic Exchange, at
the time of shipment. These contracts are over the counter and are not done through the
exchange.
Trading of Freight futures for dry and wet bulk has also started through Imarex, a
Norwegian Electronic Exchange, and is growing rapidly. Imarex had 10 transactions in the first
quarter of 2002 but in the last quarter of 2004 it had 1200 transactions and 15% of the freight
derivatives market (Pierron, 2005).
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Markets
One point of view, expressed by a carrier practitioner is that containers can be looked
upon as commodities. (CTL, 2005). Looking at ocean transportation of containers from that point
of view would allow the creation of an index for transportation of containers over specific lanes.
If the carrier requires different payments depending on the content of the container, e.g. due to
insurance cost, that is something that can be negotiated separately from the transportation cost
itself.
The power of this idea is that a futures market for container shipments combines
uncertainties into one metric. Instead of having industry players try to hedge internally against
currency fluctuations, fuel price fluctuations, and other exogenous uncertainties, and thereby
compete with large financial institutions that are specialized in each separate market, they can
hedge against a metric that is specific to their industry, a metric that they have the advantage of
knowing well.
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5 Conclusion
This thesis has described an industry that is stuck in historical inefficiencies. The
practices within the industry pitch shippers and carriers up against each other, with each making
their fortune when the other one is doing badly. It is an industry that accepts uncertainties that
are specific to the industry as given, instead of creating a cooperative environment that can
eliminate the uncertainties.
5.1 Challenge Everything
The first conclusion of this thesis is that carriers and shippers need to break out of the
current paradigm and start cooperating on a level that creates value by removing inefficiencies.
In order for this to succeed they must make sure that the cooperation stretches throughout the
transportation chain to the ports and the infrastructure that links the ports to the inland. This can
only be achieved if incentives are aligned so that the industry has a clear perception of where the
value lies. The thesis states that flexibility is an asset that has been severely undervalued in the
industry. A real options approach is suggested in order to correctly value flexibility. This will
lead to a restructuring that will unlock value.
The second conclusion of this thesis is that shippers and carriers should join to create a
futures market for transportation of containers. This would allow them to hedge against
uncertainties that affect the market of containerized ocean transportation the most. The
uncertainties that the industry cannot eliminate, the exogenous uncertainties, are also being
handled inefficiently today. Carriers hedge against fluctuations in fuel prices, but still have
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contractual mechanism to change prices to shippers when fuel prices change. Shippers are
generally not hedging against individual exogenous uncertainties because of the high risk it can
involve.
5.2 Where to Start
The change that is recommended here has to be well thought out, carefully planned, and
the companies involved have to be both willing and able to make the transition. The first steps
will define the success of the change.
The first step is for shippers, carriers, and ports to get together. They need to understand
each others operations in order to be able to bring forward ideas that add value. These must be
companies that are willing to share all information about their operations. The shipper taking part
must be willing to have the carrier come over to its facilities to understand how they operate and
make suggestions. Conversely, the carrier must be willing to have the shipper look at its
operations and to be open to suggestions. The same thing applies to the carriers and the ports,
and the ports and the shipper, since the shipper is often on both sides of the transportation chain.
It is both shipping the goods and receiving them. A carrier doesn't need to select its most
important customer to participate in the project. A better choice may be a smaller innovative
shipper that is close to a smaller innovate port. And it need not be the whole operations of the
shipper or the port that would be looked at.
The second step is to direct the focus to a narrow area of the business, so that the project
doesn't fail because of an over-ambition. The companies should then go through activities based
costing to understand exactly where the cost is created. They should also go through a real
options study to understand where flexibility is needed and how much it is worth.
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The third step is to create a pilot project based on the results from the second step, that
could prove how much value there is to be unleashed. Everyone that would be involved in the
change needs to be informed on what is taking place and why it is taking place. The incentive
system of the companies and their employees needs to be aligned with the change process of the
pilot project. Otherwise they will continue to do what they did before, i.e. to do what they are
paid to do. The pilot project needs to be well defined and metrics need to be created in order to
measure the success. The problems incurred in the pilot project would then need to be analyzed
and understood before broadening the focus and tying other parts of the operations together. A
pilot project and the experience it brings are essential in order to get more shippers and ports to
participate and believe in the concept.
5.3 Future Research
There are three main areas that need further research.
First, a study of shippers, carriers, and ports, needs to be carried out in order to seek out
companies that are both willing and able to take part in the steps described in section 5.2. The
study should address what are the largest obstacles to the change and suggest ways to overcome
them.
Second, an activities based costing research would be valuable. This research would
focus on the transportation chain and seek to understand what drives the cost in the chain as a
whole, as opposed to doing an activities based study only in the manufacturing facilities and
another one only in the ports. Optimizing the operations at each point in the transportation chain
without taking the other points into consideration can only lead to suboptimal results. One
approach might be to follow a container on its way from the origin to the destination. The
manufacturing cycle and how the container is loaded and then unloaded would have to be studied
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in this context. This research should address how the cooperation between carriers and terminal
operators is, how the cooperation between a shipper and a carrier is, and where the inefficiencies
are. This should be a challenge-all study that doesn't accept any assumptions as obvious.
Third, data needs to be collected on the uncertainties identified in this thesis. The
volatility needs to be calculated and analyzed. It is important to realize if the volatilities are
correlated. This data is necessary in order to put a price on the real options suggested in this
thesis. The research should also address how surcharges have developed and analyze if they fall
as easily as they rise. In order to create a futures market, it also needs to be understood, which
uncertainties drive the price of shipping the container and a method needs to be defined in order
to create an index that could be used for such a market. Experience from other derivatives
markets, such as those for energy, should be analyzed with the industry of containerized ocean
transportation in mind.
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A Appendix A: Vocabulary
Aframax Tanker 80,000 to 120,000 dwt (about 500,000 barrels of crude oil). A part of the
flexible market scale (Surveyor, 2002).
Air draft The height of the span of a bridge over the surface of the water (Surveyor,
2002).
AISA American Institute for Shippers' Associations
Baby capes The first generation of capesize and are usually smaller than capesizes
produced today (Surveyor, 2002).
BAF Bunker Adjustment Factor, i.e. a surcharge to adjust for fuel price volatility
CAF Currency Adjustment Factor
Capesize Any dry bulk carrier above 80,000 dwt. Usually 130,000 to 190,000 dwt
(Surveyor, 2002).
CAPM Capital Asset Pricing Model
Dunkirk-size A subcategory of capes ize, which is restricted by the dimensions of the two
ore and coal ports in Dunkirk, France (Surveyor, 2002).
Dwt Dead weight tons
ELAA The European Liners Affairs Association
ESC European Shippers' Council
FEU Forty-foot Equivalent Unit, i.e. a 40 foot long container
Fixed afra scale A historical rigid scale for wet bulk carriers that has not been modernized
(Surveyor, 2002).
Flexible market A modernized scale for the sizes of wet bulk carriers (Surveyor, 2002).
scale
FMC Federal Maritime Commission
Geared A ship that has its own crane for loading and unloading (Surveyor, 2002).
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Gearless A ship that is not geared (Surveyor, 2002).
GP General Purpose. Wet Bulk Carrier below 25,000 dwt. A part of the Fixed
afra scale (Surveyor, 2002).
GRI General Rate Increase (decided or recommended by a conference)
Handy Smallest carriers for dry bulk. There are two types: Handysize and
Handymax. They carry a wide mix of cargo, can operate in all ports. There
are around 3800 handys in the world, out of 6000 dry bulk carriers. They
can be geared or gearless (Surveyor, 2002).
Handymax Dry bulk ship of 40,000 dwt to 60,000 dwt by definition but are usually
50,000 dwt to 52,000 dwt (Surveyor, 2002).
Handysize Dry bulk ship of 10,000 dwt to 40,000 dwt. See handy (Surveyor, 2002).
Intascale International Tanker Freight Scale
LR- I Large Range 1. Wet Bulk Carrier larger than MR but below 80,000 dwt. A
part of the Fixed afra scale (Surveyor, 2002).
LR-2 Large Range 2. Wet Bulk Carrier larger than LR-1 but below 160,000 dwt.
A part of the Fixed afra scale (Surveyor, 2002).
MQC Minimum Quantity Commitment
MR Medium Range. Wet Bulk Carrier larger than GP but below 50,000 dwt. A
part of the Fixed afra scale (Surveyor, 2002).
NVOCC Non-Vessel Operating Common Carriers
OHBC Open hatch bulk carriers (Surveyor, 2002).
OSRA Ocean Shipping Reform Act of 1998
Panamax Next dry bulk size above handymax, 61,000 to 80,000 dwt. There were
around 1,000 panamaxes in service in 2002 and they are designed to be the
maximum size that can pass through the Panama Canal (Surveyor, 2002).
Panamax Tanker 60,000 to 80,000 dwt (about 400,000 barrels of crude oil). A part of the
flexible market scale (Surveyor, 2002).
Product Tanker 10,000 to 60,000 dwt wet bulk carrier. A part of the flexible market scale
(Surveyor, 2002).
PSS Peak Season Surcharge
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Suezmax Tanker 120,000 to 200,000 dwt (about 1,000,000 barrels of crude oil). A part of
the flexible market scale. Few of them can actually pass through the Suez
canal (Surveyor, 2002).
TEU Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit, i.e. a 20 foot long container
ULCC Ultra-large crude carrier. Wet Bulk Carrier larger than VLCC but below
550,000 dwt. A part of the Fixed afra scale (Surveyor, 2002).
ULCC Ultra-Large Crude Carrier, 320,000 to 550,000 dwt (about 3,000,000
barrels of crude oil). A part of the flexible market scale (Surveyor, 2002).
USMC scale A standard rate scale developed by the Ministry of Transportation in
Britain during World War II, in order to fairly compensate private owners
of ships that were used for the transportation of military supplies
(Surveyor, 2002).
VLCC Very Large crude carrier. Wet Bulk Carrier larger than LR-2 but below
320,000 dwt. A part of the Fixed afra scale (Surveyor, 2002).
VLCC Very Large Crude Carrier, 200,000 to 315,000 dwt (about 2,000,000
barrels of crude oil). A part of the flexible market scale (Surveyor, 2002).
VLOC Very large ore carrier, up to 365,000 dwt (Surveyor, 2002).
Worldscale Short for New Worldwide Tanker Nominal Freight Scale. Scale for cost of
transportation over specific routes. See www.worldscale.com. Actual
freight rates for wet bulk is commonly presented as a percentage of the
worldscale (Surveyor, 2002).
